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Here is Freud on psychoanalytic process in 1913: “The analyst . . . cannot determine 
beforehand exactly what results he will effect.  He sets in motion a process . . . He can 
supervise this process, further it, remove obstacles in its way, and he can undoubtedly vitiate 
much of it.  But on the whole, once begun, it goes its own way and does not allow either the 
direction it takes or the order in which it picks up its points to be prescribed for it . . .” (12, 
130).  On repetition and working through in 1914, Freud writes, “As long as the patient is in 
the treatment he cannot escape from [the] compulsion to repeat . . .The working through of 
the resistances may in practice turn out to be an arduous task for the subject of the analysis 
and a trial of patience for the analyst.  Nevertheless it is a part of the work which effects the 
greatest changes in the patient . . .” (12, 150, 155). 
 Here is an example of what Freud meant, an example that does not require any 
information about the patient, because it concerns the psychoanalytic process itself.  The 
patient is in the terminal phase of a very long analysis.  As almost always happens in the 
termination phase, the patient revisits the basic conflicts that brought him/her to treatment.  As 
I listen to the patient speak of these issues one day, I think of an interpretation I have made 
many times before.  I hesitate, feeling that at this point I should not be saying the same thing yet 
again.  But then I think, no: this is what the material calls for.  So I make the interpretation, and 
the patient responds: “I know you have said that over and over.  But this time it’s different.”  I 
am surprised, and so is the patient.  Something unpredictable has happened.  It concerns 
repetition and difference.  One cannot predict when repetition will make a difference.    
 When Freud speaks of the unpredictability of the analytic process, and of the necessity 
of repeated working through, he is not thinking about unconscious process itself in terms of 
repetition and difference.   Repetition for him is the obstacle to change, not the condition of 
change; he would not be thinking about unpredictability as a condition of repetition and 
difference.  For Nietzsche (1968), however, chance, repetition and difference are necessary 
elements of a theory of unconscious processes.   For Heidegger the thinking of process itself is 
a thinking of time, of time as auto-affective (1990), self-referential: “time temporalizes itself” 
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(1996, 302).  Time has to be auto-affective because it cannot be thought as either subjective or 
objective.  It is between them, intermediate.  All of this to explain why my topic is 
psychoanalytic process, self-reference, and intermediacy.  I think that the future of 
psychoanalysis as a clinical endeavor depends upon these concepts. 
 I will approach my topic through a few pages from Derrida’s essay on Mallarmé, “The 
Double Session, first published in Tel Quel in 1971.  Although its topic is mimesis, Derrida 
specifies from the outset that he will also explore what he  calls “l’entre de Mallarmé,” the 
“between” of Mallarmé, i.e. the intermediate.  At a crucial moment, Derrida analyzes the 
“between of Mallarmé” in terms of self-reference and undecidability (chance), leading him to 
compare what he is saying about Mallarmé to ideas from Gödel and Freud.  A surprising 
juxtaposition.   
 Derrida is demonstrating how Mallarmé undermines the traditional understanding of 
mimesis.  If mimesis implies a reference to what is imitated, Mallarmé’s writing “plays out a 
difference. . . without referent” (219). It performs a “perpetual allusion.”  As allusion without 
referent, the only thing it can allude to is “itself in the process of alluding” (219; my emphasis)  
This self-referential process is ludic, ”a game conforming only to its own formal rules.”  As self-
referential, it has no inherent truth.  But this does not mean that it is false, “an error. . . or 
illusion” (219).  In other words, it concerns reality—it is not an illusion—but cannot be judged 
true or false in conventional terms.  Derrida says that “by analogy” (his emphasis), he is calling 
the reality of this process “undecidable.”  The analogy is to Gödel: “An undecidable 
proposition, as Gödel demonstrated in 1931, is a proposition which, given a system of axioms 
governing a multiplicity, is neither an analytical nor a deductive consequence of those axioms, 
nor in contradiction with them, neither true nor false with respect to those axioms” (219). 
 In the next paragraph, Derrida says that undecidability is not a function of “some 
enigmatic equivocality,” nor of a contradictory meaning of primal words—a reference to Karl 
Abel’s pamphlet on this topic.  Here Derrida appends a footnote, in which he says that he is 
referring “less to the text in which Freud is directly inspired by Abel (1910), than to Das 
Unheimliche  (1919), of which we are here, in sum proposing a rereading” (220, n32).  I believe 
that this is Derrida’s first reference to “The Uncanny.”  He will say many things about it in the 
years to come, although he will never devote a specific text to it, nor to Heidegger on the 
uncanny.  Notice the progression: Mallarmé’s self referential process of allusion, intermediacy, 
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undecidability, Gödel, Freud.  And the statement that “The Double Session” is a rereading of 
“The Uncanny.”  Derrida goes on to explain why. “We find ourselves constantly being brought 
back to that text by the paradoxes [my emphasis] of the double and of repetition, the blurring of 
the boundary lines between ‘imagination’ and ‘reality,’ between the ‘symbol’ and the ‘thing it 
symbolizes, the references to Hoffman and the literature of the fantastic, the considerations on 
the double meaning  [Derrida’s emphasis] of words. . .” (220, n32). 
 To speak of Gödel and to reopen “The Uncanny” give me pause.  I have no expert 
knowledge of mathematics, and so much has been said about “The Uncanny.”  It is tempting to 
leave it where Derrida leaves it: Gödel and Freud on paradoxical undecidability.  But Derrida is 
posing an intriguing problem. What might it mean to reread “The Uncanny” via an analogy to 
Gödel in relation to paradoxical self-referential processes? 
 Derrida refers to Gödel’s undecidability, but does not mention Gödel’s larger point, the 
crux of the two “incompleteness” theorems.  I will try to explain.  Let us start with Gödel’s 
first incompleteness theorem: “’One can (assuming the [formal] consistency of classical 
mathematics) even give examples of propositions. . . which are really contextually [materially] 
true but unprovable in the formal system of classical mathematics” (cited in Goldstein, 155-6).   
This immediately implies that it is impossible to prove the consistency of a system of arithmetic 
from within that system—hence its incompleteness.  In other words, true but unprovable—
undecidable—propositions produce the incompleteness of  arithmetic, supposedly the very 
model of an axiomatic system.  It would take too long to explain the background debates in 
mathematics that set Gödel on the path to incompleteness.  Suffice it to say that Hilbert’s work 
on the foundations of geometry had proposed that geometry can be formalized if arithmetic can 
be formalized.  It had seemed that this was a realizable goal, that arithmetic could be proven to 
be both complete and consistent, until certain paradoxes in set theory—most famously 
Russell’s “the set of all sets that are not members of themselves”—proved uneliminable.  
Hilbert found this intolerable.  Gödel proved that it was the nature of mathematical reality.  As 
Rebecca Goldstein puts it, “Gödel subverted Hilbert’s program of eliminating paradox by using 
paradox in the very structure of his proof” (164).  He proved that there are unprovable truths.        
 Not only did Gödel prove that paradox was mathematical reality, the mechanisms of his 
proof depended upon the self referential nature of paradox. “The affinity between the 
incompleteness result and self-referential paradox is. . . very deep, since every proof of 
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incompleteness has some version of self-referential paradoxicality lurking around in the 
background” (Goldstein, p. 165, n.5).  The mathematical technicality here is the numbering 
system invented by Gödel.  This numbering system allows “propositions to engage in an 
interesting sort of double speak, saying something arithmetical and also commenting on their 
own situation with the formal system” (Goldstein, p. 176).  This explains why Derrida can use 
an analogy to Gödelian undecidability, self reference, and paradox to illustrate Mallarméan self 
referential allusion.  Derrida, at this phase of his career, is also much interested in words which 
themselves have double, contradictory meanings; he found a consistent pattern of use of such 
words in the philosophical treatment of the relation between writing and language itself.  
Derrida has carefully  specified that this has nothing to do with something like “the antithetical 
meaning of primal words.”  Rather, these words themselves mark the undecidable, paradoxical 
processes Mallarmé and Gödel are describing, and that Freud encounters when he examine the 
uncanny.  In fact,  Unheimlich  itself is such a word, an important point for Freud. 
 A few basic points from Das Unheimliche (1919).   Speaking of the uncanny effect of the 
double, Freud says: “. . . the subject identifies himself with someone else, so that he is in doubt 
as to which his self is, or substitutes the extraneous self for his own.  In other words, there is a 
doubling, dividing and interchanging of the self” (17, 235). The very next sentence reads: “And 
finally there is the constant recurrence of the same thing. . . ” (ibid.).  It is not clear in context 
whether Freud sees that doubling itself is repetition; rather he seems to be making a list of 
uncanny effects.  He goes on to cite Rank on the theme of the double, particularly the idea of 
the double as insurance against destruction of the ego.  This is what led the Egyptians to make 
images of the dead in “lasting materials”—i.e. as indestructible doubles of the once living 
person.  Freud comments that ideas of indestructibility derive from “the soil of unbounded self-
love, from the primary narcissism which dominates the mind of the child and of primitive man.  
But when this stage has been surmounted, the ‘double’ reverses its aspect.  From having been 
an assurance of immortality, it becomes the uncanny harbinger of death” (ibid.).   
 Freud pursues the theme of uncanniness in relation to primary narcissism on the next 
page.  “When all is said and done, the quality of uncanniness can only  [my emphasis, nur  in the 
original] come from the fact of the ‘double’ being a creation dating back to a very early mental 
stage, long since surmounted—a stage, incidentally, at which it wore a more friendly aspect.  
The ‘double’ has become a thing of terror. . . other forms of ego-disturbance. . . can easily be 
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estimated along the same lines as the theme of the ‘double.’  They are a harking back to 
particular phases in the evolution of the self-regarding feeling, a regression to a time when the 
ego had not yet marked itself off sharply from the external world and from other people.  I 
believe that these factors are partly responsible for the impression of uncanniness, although it is 
not easy to isolate and determine exactly their share of it.”  New paragraph: “The factor of the 
repetition of the same thing will perhaps not appeal to everyone as a source of uncanny feeling” 
(17, 236).  Again, from doubling to repetition. 
 Freud’s reasoning is that the psychological origin of the uncanny double can only be 
primary narcissism, the stage at which there is no division of internal and external, subject and 
object.  To use Freud’s later expression (1941) “being the breast precedes having the breast” 
(23, 250).  If one is  the breast, however, there is “doubling, dividing, and interchanging of the 
self.”  One is as the repetition of oneself.  Since doubling is also dividing, one is  as the 
difference of oneself.  Every self-referential paradox has this structure: it is always in difference 
from itself, and hence practices a kind of double speak.  Freud does not account for the 
transition between the “friendly” and terrifying aspects of uncanniness.  Perhaps it is more 
accurate to say that as the possibility of doubling and dividing, primary narcissism, the relation 
of the baby to the breast, is in and of itself “friendly” and terrifying.  The overall point, as 
indicated in Freud’s gerunds—doubling, dividing, interchanging—is that this is a self-referential 
process.  So we circle back to Derrida on Mallarmé’s self referential process of allusion, the 
analogy to Gödel, and the rereading of “The Uncanny.” 
 Derrida had said that Mallarméan allusion is not illusion, but neither is it real in the 
sense of being objectively true or false.  Confronted with exactly this implication of 
mathematical reality, Gödel famously took it as vindication of Plato on the reality of a pure, 
abstract realm accessible only by reason.  However, it is a strange Platonism that would have to 
include the reality of neither true nor false self-referential paradoxes.  On the other side, we all 
know Freud’s arguments for psychoanalytic positivism.  But it would be a strange positivism that 
would have to include the reality of uncanny doubling, dividing repetition at the heart of 
unconscious processes--primary narcissism as the only possible origin of uncanniness.   One of 
the most important implications of Derrida’s juxtaposition of Mallarmé, Gödel, and Freud is 
that the reality each describes cannot be transcendental or empirical.  In all his readings of “The 
Uncanny” Derrida has emphasized Freud’s statement that literature “is a much more fertile 
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province than the uncanny in real life, for it contains the whole of the latter and something 
more besides, something that cannot be found in real life. . . . The somewhat paradoxical result 
is that in the first place a great deal that is not uncanny in fiction would be so if it happened in real life; 
and in the second place that there are many more means of creating uncanny effects in fiction than 
there are in real life “ (17, 249).  Freud is noting a paradoxical result about the relation between 
“real life” and fiction as concerns the uncanny.  Is he stumbling upon an aspect of reality that is 
as paradox, that is fictive, but not in the sense of illusion?  Can we extend this idea to primary 
narcissism as the possibility of uncanniness--fictive, neither true nor false, but real?  Paradoxical, 
undecidable, and unpredictable? 
 Let us step back for a moment, and not forget that Freud mainly understands 
uncanniness in terms of the return of the repressed—the unfamiliar at the heart of the familiar.  
The return of the repressed has two aspects: return and repressed.  The latter is content—
sexuality, aggression, wishes, fantasies, etc. The former is process—return itself, repetition.  
When one thinks of clinical process in Freud’s sense, on the whole one thinks of interpretation 
of fantasy, wish, drive, anxiety, defense, transference, and especially transference-resistance.   
From Freud’s point of view, such clinical process justifies psychoanalytic positivism.  When he 
speaks of repetition, the repetition compulsion, and return, he does not consider repetition as 
a process, a self-referential, paradoxical process, although he hints at this in “The Uncanny.”  
Nor does he ever link the process of repetition to the very repetitive process that is 
psychoanalysis itself, in the literal sense of the return of the patient to the analyst’s office over a 
long period of time.  But it is precisely this repetition that unpredictably makes a difference.  
This is the impersonal process—it is the same for every patient—that enframes the intensely 
personal, content oriented nature of most of what transpires between patient and analyst.  The 
hypothesis I am trying to develop is that the reality of the impersonal process is the reality of 
self-referential, undecidable, intermediate primary narcissism.  When analyst and patient meet 
in what I am deliberately calling this transitional space, repetition makes a difference.  The 
objective presence of the patient in the analyst’s office by no means guarantees such a meeting, 
but without the repetitive return to the analyst, it cannot occur at all.  While this might seem 
tautological—of course if the patient does not go to the analyst no analysis takes place—I am 
suggesting that the therapeutic effect of analysis depends as much upon the reality of 
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impersonal, unpredictable, paradoxical process as it does upon the interpretation of personal, 
causal content. 
 I have thought for a long time that this way of conceiving psychoanalytic process not 
only requires the deconstructive thinking of difference and repetition, but also puts 
psychoanalysis into dialogue with those areas of science which think in terms of paradox, 
intermediacy, doubling, difference, and repetition—again a strong implication of Derrida’s 
linkage of Gödel and Freud. One can go back to Freud in the Project (1895) and to his thinking 
about brain-mind to say more about these impersonal aspects of psychoanalytic process.  When 
Freud made unconscious memory formation dependent upon the process he called Bahnung, 
“pathbreaking,” “breaching”—a sense completely lost in the translation of Bahnung  by 
“facilitation”—he used the vocabulary of difference and repetition, as Derrida demonstrated 
long ago in “Freud and the Scene of Writing” (1978).  Derrida however did not pay attention to 
another aspect of Bahnung: what Freud calls the “experience of satisfaction.”  Briefly, Freud 
thought that when the baby is fed, an unconscious image is stored in a pathway opened up by 
Bahnung.  My idea is that one also has to consider Bahnung in relation to primary narcissism, or 
even “being the breast.”  In other words, the context in which Bahnung  occurs as difference 
and repetition is the context in which there is no subject or object.  Hence, the process is 
auto-affective, self-referential. I think this is why Freud later saw the origin of the uncanny in 
primary narcissism, and why Bahnung, even if “friendly,” itself implies doubling and dividing of 
the self.  And when Freud says in the Project that the experience of satisfaction is the origin of a 
relation to the world and to thought, such that we always cognize in relation to an other (1, 
331), I think he is providing a model for the psychoanalytic process itself.  One makes a 
difference in the other when they repeatedly join in the uncanny space of primary narcissism.  
Here I am combining Freud’s speculations about the brain with some of his psychological 
thinking.  Strikingly, there are aspects of contemporary thinking about the brain that situate 
such processes in neuronal matter itself, which was Freud’s intent in the Project.   I want to 
speak of some of this thinking, mainly to see what kind of language scientists find themselves 
having to use to describe such unusual aspects of reality.  
 The great evolutionary thinker of contemporary neuroscience is Gerald Edelman, who 
dedicates Bright Air, Brilliant Fire to Darwin and Freud.  His aim is to apply Darwinian ideas about 
populations to how mind emerges from the matter of the brain.  Edelman’s point of departure 
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is a neurological fact about the brain: even though the brain gets input from the sense organs, 
and produces output via its connection to muscles and glands, the major portion of the brain 
receives input from other parts of the brain, and gives output to other parts without direct 
connection to the external world.  The brain is “in touch more with itself than with anything 
else” (19).  The brain is primarily auto-affective, “a self-organizing system” (25).  The “matter of 
the mind interacts with itself at all times,” and this is the possibility of memory (29).  Call it 
neurological primary narcissism.   
 Edelman explains how “neurological primary narcissism” produces memory.  Like Freud 
in the Project, but from a different point of view, he is concerned with the neurology of 
memory, the mechanics of memory.  He starts with an elaborate comparison to the immune 
system.  As a “recognition system,” the immune system must have “memory” in order to 
function.  The memory of the immune system is clearly not psychological, but cellular.  
Originally, the theory was that a foreign molecule transferred information about its shape and 
structure to the antibody molecule, and then removed itself, leaving a “cookie cutter” shape to 
which identical foreign molecules could bind.  This apparently commonsensical theory turned 
out to be wrong, and was replaced by a much more counterintuitive theory. Roughly speaking, 
a foreign molecule encounters “a population of cells, each with a different  [author’s emphasis] 
antibody... It binds to those cells. . . having antibodies whose combining sites happen  [my 
emphasis] to be more or less complementary to it.  When a portion of an antigen binds to an 
antibody with a sufficiently close fit, it stimulates the cell. . . bearing that antibody to divide 
repeatedly  [my emphasis].”  These cells are clones, i.e. doubles.  Hence, “the whole process is 
one of differential reproduction by clonal selection” (77).  The cellular memory of the immune 
system depends upon a chance encounter in an originally differentiated population, division, 
doubling, repetition.   Call it cellular unheimlichkeit.  As Edelman puts it, the immune system is a 
“molecular recognition system that is noncognitive. . .Like evolution it has a generator of 
diversity..., a means of perpetuating changes by a kind of heredity (clonal division)” (78). 
 What does this have to do with the neurology of memory?  Edelman thinks that 
memory itself is a “selective recognition system,” working according to principles like those of 
the immune system.  As in the immune system, “diversity exists beforehand” in the matter of 
the brain (79-80).  The “enormous variation,” and “stochastic [i.e. probabilistic, statistical] 
fluctuation of cell movement, extension and death, involves not single neurons, but populations 
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of them” (hence the Darwinian resonance) (83).  During behavior, synaptic connections are 
strengthened or weakened biochemically.  “This mechanism, which underlies memory. . . 
effectively ‘carves out’ a variety of functioning circuits  [author’s emphasis]. . . ” (83-85).  Call it  
“biochemical Bahnung” in an originally differentiated population.  (Recall that Freud had 
postulated that the possibility of Bahnung depends upon the originally differentiated resistances 
of psi neurons to incoming stimuli.)  Finally, via a process Edelman calls “reentry,” neuronal 
groups receive stimuli and form “maps. . . connected by massively parallel and reciprocal 
connections” (85).  Edelman describes this connectivity in irreducibly complex language: “...each 
cell contacts cells in its own group and in other groups. . . [producing] the dense intrinsic 
connectivity of groups... each cell therefore receives inputs from cells in its own group, from 
cells in other groups, and from extrinsic sources” (88).  The first two forms of connectivity—
jinput from cells in its own group and from cells in other groups--describes the “self organizing” 
or auto-affective or self-referential functioning of the matter of the brain.  The reentry or 
mapping process is like the clonal reproduction of the immune system, but is also the link 
between noncognitive and cognitive recognition.  So we have a noncognitive, auto-affective, 
differentiated, doubling and dividing process as the possibility of cognitive memory.  This 
infrastructure of memory shares important features with Bahnung in primary narcissism: auto-
affection in an originally differentiated structure.  Unlike most of Freud’s thinking about 
unconscious determinism, Edelman’s conception of memory is probabilistic, unpredictable.  
Recall that clinical process itself is unpredictable.  I am comparing the non-cognitive 
infrastructure of memory described by Edelman to the infrastructure of analysis, to the 
possibility of repetition making a difference in the intermediate “space” of primary narcissism.  
 One of Edelman’s aims is to debunk the myth that the brain functions like a computer.  
He shares this aim with Roger Penrose, although he disagrees with Penrose’s account of brain-
mind interaction.  Penrose is a fearless speculator.  The Emperor’s New Mind—i.e. the imaginary 
clothing of the brain in a computer model—is a complicated voyage through mathematics, some 
of the further reaches of quantum theory, and brain research.  Gödel is again onstage, and so 
are considerations of intermediacy.  A few examples, again to emphasize the kind of thinking 
and language used to describe what I am calling infrastructural processes.   
 Penrose undertakes a mathematical demonstration of why the brain-mind cannot 
function like a computer by going back to Alan Turing, the inventor of computers, who 
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demonstrated that it is impossible for computers, necessarily operating according to rules, 
algorithms, to solve certain problems about computers themselves.  Penrose reminds us that 
“Turing found his argument after studying the work of Gödel.  Gödel himself was well aware of 
the Russell paradox, and was able to transform paradoxical reasoning of this kind. . .” (111).  
Penrose also wants to explain how we can grasp this non-logic of logic.  He says that we “see  
[author’s emphasis] the validity of the Gödel proposition. . . though we cannot derive it from 
the axioms.  The type of ‘seeing’ that is involved. . . requires a mathematical insight that is not 
the result of the purely algorithmic operations that could be coded into some mathematical 
formal system” (110).  Restated: “. . . what was historically perhaps the most important part of 
[Gödel’s] argument. . . [was] the ‘undecidability’ of the consistency of the axioms.  My purpose. 
. . [is] to show that a specific Gödel proposition—neither provable nor disprovable using the 
axioms and rules of the formal system under consideration—is clearly seen. . . to be a true 
proposition” [author’s emphases] (116)  “True” here means mathematically real.  This was why 
Gödel considered himself a Platonist, and so does Penrose.  But this is a Platonism of the 
undecidable, of a reality whose “truth” is between the usual senses of true and false, objectively 
real and not real.   
 Penrose’s most controversial step is to extend this conception of reality to brain-mind 
via quantum theory.  He is very clear that contrary to popular opinion, quantum theory does 
not simply concern subatomic processes, but the world we inhabit.  He says: “The very 
existence of solid bodies, the strengths and physical properties of materials, the nature of 
chemistry, the colours of substances, the phenomena of freezing and boiling... these, and many 
other familiar properties, require the quantum theory for their explanations.  Perhaps, also, the 
phenomenon of consciousness is something that cannot be understood in entirely classical 
terms.  Perhaps our minds are qualities rooted in some strange and wonderful feature of those 
physical laws which actually govern the world we inhabit, rather than being just features of some 
algorithm acted out by the so-called ‘objects’ of a classical physical structure.  Perhaps, in some 
sense, this is ‘why’ we, as sentient beings, must live in a quantum world, rather than an entirely 
classical one” (226).  To take the most famous examples, this would mean that Heisenberg’s 
uncertainty, which introduces an impossibility into deterministic measurements, and Bohr’s 
complementarity, which introduces a transitional relation between apparent opposites, describe 
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the reality of brain-mind.  This reality can be seen  in the way Gödel and Penrose call “Platonic.”  
  
 There is a wonderful contradiction here.  Penrose accurately links quantum phenomena 
to the actual world.  As he writes about the most familiar example of complementarity: “How 
is it that light can consist of particles and of field oscillations at the same time?  These two 
conceptions seem irrevocably opposed. . . [T]he dichotomy between particles and field that had 
been a feature of classical theory is not respected by Nature. . . Somehow Nature contrives to 
build a consistent world in which particles and field-oscillations are the same thing!  Or, rather, her 
world consists of some more subtle ingredient, the words ‘particle’ and ‘wave’ conveying but 
partially appropriate pictures” (230-1). This is why Bohr and Heisenberg considered themselves 
positivists.  They were describing the real world.  But their positivism is just as strange as 
Gödel’s Platonism.  What is a positivism of uncertainty and complementarity?  Of the reality of 
intermediacy? 
 There are many other examples of intermediacy in quantum theory.  Again, contrary to 
popular opinion, subatomic processes are not completely probabilistic, nor are macroscopic 
processes completely deterministic.  For instance, on the subatomic level, as Max Born put it, 
the motion of particles follows probability laws, but the probability itself propagates according 
to the law of causality (Pais 258).  This is akin to Penrose’s statement that nature comprises 
something between particles and wave, and so inevitably something between chance and 
causality. Born took an image from Einstein to describe the relation between a wave field and 
light quanta.  The way in which the wave field determines the probability of a light quantum makes 
it virtual, spectral, literally a “’ghost field’” (ibid.)  Dirac, describing processes of photon—light 
particle—scattering, found simultaneous absorption and emission of energy, which appears to 
violate the principle of conservation of energy.  However, there is no actual violation because 
the principle does not apply.  The principle does not apply “because of the transient existence 
of the intermediate state. . . whence its alternative name: virtual state” (Pais 338).  Pauli had to 
describe certain anomalies in emission from the atomic core by postulating “’a peculiar not 
classically describable two-valuedness [Zweideutigkeit, literally double meaning] of the quantum 
theoretical properties of the valency electron’” (Pais 272). 
 I am deliberately using examples which recall Derrida: the between of chance and 
causality, virtuality, spectrality, double meaning.  Arkady Plotnitsky has in fact articulated the 
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theoretical links between Gödel, quantum theory, and Derrida, and has extended them to 
psychoanalysis.  He writes: “The undecidability of mathematical logic [Gödel] does not lead 
strictly to complementarity as uncertainty does in quantum mechanics; but it does suggest, 
metaphorically, the possibility—and perhaps the necessity—of a kind of undecidable 
complementarity.  The latter may be found in Derrida, where it indicates a relation to, and 
dependence—theoretical, metaphorical, and historical—on both models, that of Gödelian logic 
and that of quantum mechanics” (71).  Plotnitsky advocates an integration of the rethinking of 
matter with the Freudian unconscious via Derrida, particularly via Derrida’s reading of the 
Project.  For Derrida, because Freud’s brain-mind model makes all perception a condition of the 
trace, of Bahnung, it functions according to the temporal-spatial process of differance.   I want to 
bring all of this to bear on some of Penrose’s thoughts about brain-mind. 
 Penrose is much taken by experiments which have demonstrated what he calls the 
“time delays of consciousness” (439).  Briefly, experiments in which subjects were either asked 
to perform an action voluntarily, or were passively subject to brain stimulation, have shown a 
significant interval between brain activity and action performed or sensation felt.  No subject 
was consciously aware of this interval (441).  Penrose: “. . . the ‘time’ of all one’s ‘perceptions’ 
is actually delayed by about half a second from the ‘actual’ time—as though one’s internal clock 
is simply ‘wrong’ by about half a second or so.  The time at which one perceives an event to 
take place would then always be half a second after the actual occurrence of that event.  This 
would present a consistent, albeit disturbingly delayed, picture of sense impressions” (441-2).  
Penrose says that we are probably “wrong when we apply the usual physical rules for time  
when we consider consciousness. . . I think that it is possible that a very different conception 
may be required when we try to place conscious perception into a conventionally time-ordered 
framework” (443).  Returning to the topic of how one “sees” something that is demonstrable 
but not perceivable, (the question he raised about Gödelian undecidability), Penrose restates his 
Platonic convictions about a timeless, transcendental realm accessible only by reason.   Here, it 
seems to me, he is unable to envision that the other thinking of time he is after is precisely one 
which thinks the primacy of delay, as per Derrida’s reading of the Project.  Even if Penrose 
cannot take this step, he lucidly envisions the way in which such seeing is complicated by the 
mainly self-referential nature of brain processes: “. . . it is hard to see how one could begin to 
develop a quantum-theoretical description of brain action when one might well have to regard 
Konturen III (2010) 
 
147 
the brain as ‘observing itself’ all the time. . . when that theory arrives, [it] will be even further 
from having a conventional space-time description” (446).  The time of the brain observing itself 
all the time, the time of self-reference, is differance. 
 What does all this heavy lifting have to do with ordinary analysis?  I am suggesting that 
the unpredictably of the analytic process is a function of the self-referential, paradoxical, 
intermediate time-space of primary narcissism.  I am overlapping the materially self-referential, 
transitional, doubling and dividing processes articulated by Edelman and Penrose with the 
psychologically self-referential, transitional, doubling and dividing aspects of primary narcissism 
and uncanniness.  Necessarily personal and causal interpretations can make a difference only by 
virtue of the impersonal and non-causal function of the repetitive process of analysis itself.  
Clinically, this is what distinguishes psychoanalysis from psychotherapy.  Without the literal 
repetitiveness of frequent sessions with a neutral analyst, it is not possible for a patient to 
interact with the analytic setting itself such that an auto-affective, differentiating process will 
occur.  Loewald (1988) reminds us that “neutral” itself does not simply mean objective, but 
maintaining a differential tension between patient and analyst, and that the word itself 
etymologically means “neither the one nor the other”—i.e. is paradoxical.  Again, paradoxical 
and differential.  I am also suggesting that this kind of thinking about analytic process situates it 
in what I have called the strange Platonism of self-referential paradox and the strange positivism 
of undecidability, complementarity, transitional and virtual processes. This is the reality of the 
fictive in the strong sense of not being illusion, the reality of uncanniness, of something like 
what Winnicott calls the “substance of illusion” (1975, 233).  Clinically, this reality is not 
revealed in verbal associations, but can be seen  in the interactions of the patient with the 
analytic process and setting themselves. Only a non-conventional thinking of time and space, the 
intermediate difference and delay of self-referential paradox, explains the possibility of 
psychoanalytic change—”this time it’s different.”  
  If these propositions are justified, they  open the possibility of integrating 
psychoanalysis, deconstructive thought, and aspects of science into a discipline of unconscious, 
intermediate, paradoxical auto-affective processes.  This would be a discipline of the reality of 
such processes, the reality of Gödel’s “strange Platonism” or of Bohr and Heisenberg’s “strange 
positivism,” of Freud’s literary science, and its unpredictable practice of repetition.  
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1 This is the text of a lecture delivered at Rutgers University, October 2009, in the “Analytic 
Crossings” series.  I have left it unchanged, except for this note.  I used the occasion of this 
lecture to begin to sketch out thoughts I hope to develop in the future.  But I am entirely aware of 
the sketchy, rhapsodic nature of my argument here.  
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